University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Center for Bioethics Papers

Center for Bioethics

April 2006

No Method, Thus Madness?
Arthur L. Caplan
University of Pennsylvania, caplan@mail.med.upenn.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/bioethics_papers

Recommended Citation
Caplan, A. L. (2006). No Method, Thus Madness?. Retrieved from https://repository.upenn.edu/
bioethics_papers/43

© The Hastings Center. Reprinted with permission. This article originally appeared in The Hastings Center Report,
Volume 36, Issue 2, April 2006, pages 12-13.
Publisher URL: http://www.thehastingscenter.org
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/bioethics_papers/43
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

No Method, Thus Madness?
Abstract
If you ask most medical school deans if they have a course, program, or center doing bioethics, they will
enthusiastically assure you that they do. And their enthusiasm for bioethics grows exponentially in
proportion to their interest in showing that they are doing something about managing research ethics
issues at their institutions. The same can be said about the entire biomedical research establishment from private companies to independent research centers to professional organizations - bioethics is on
the masthead, the organizational chart, and the agenda of the annual meeting. Not to worry - medicine's
got ethics.
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No Method, Thus Madness?
by Arthur L. Caplan
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f you ask most medical school deans
if they have a course, program, or
center doing bioethics, they will enthusiastically assure you that they do.
And their enthusiasm for bioethics
grows exponentially in proportion to
their interest in showing that they are
doing something about managing research ethics issues at their institutions.
The same can be said about the entire
biomedical research establishment—
from private companies to independent
research centers to professional organizations—bioethics is on the masthead, the
organizational chart, and the agenda of
the annual meeting. Not to worry—
medicine’s got ethics.
It is certainly fine to feature bioethics
as a topic area. But there is mounting evidence that perhaps bioethics is not all
or even primarily what the doctor
should be ordering just now. Some of
the problems now ailing medicine require admitting that what has befallen
medicine and the health sciences is an
epistemological crisis as much as a moral
one.
Now this may seem an odd claim
since it is hard, or rather, completely impossible, to avoid the phrase “evidencebased medicine” in the august halls of
academic medical centers in the United
States, Europe, Australia, and New
Zealand these days. There are journals,
resource centers, toolkits, web sites, and
more publications than anyone interested in evidence-based medicine could
possibly ever read.
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So how could it be that a field that is
embracing evidence at every turn, teaching about outcomes, drilling the need
for verifiable data into the heads of the
next generation, and extolling the virtue
of evidence at every conference, meeting, seminar, and water-cooler, possibly
be in the midst of an epistemological
crisis? Where is the evidence?
!
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ontemporary medicine is sailing on
very rocky seas these days. It is
being buffeted by ever-rising costs,
doubts about its efficacy, and intrusions
on its turf from competitors that range
from optometrists, psychologists, chiropractors, midwives, and nurse-anesthetists to the friendly folks at the herb
and vitamin store. Recently, there seems
to be real uncertainty on the part of
medicine’s leaders about what to say in
the face of a continuing stream of fraud
and misconduct. The editors of the
Lancet, Science, Nature, and the New
England Journal of Medicine—the key
guardians of the evidence gates—face a
stream of questions about how they plan
to secure the gates following the
shenanigans of the South Korean researcher who lied about producing stem
cells from cloned human embryos and a
Norwegian cancer researcher who fabricated findings about ways smokers
could reduce their risk of acquiring oral
cancer, and their tortured agonizing is
painful to watch. Far from having an answer to the question of what distinguish-

es medicine as a mode of healing and a
field capable of minimizing fraud, the
leaders of the medical professional cling
to the phrase “evidence-based medicine”
as if intoning the word “evidence” will
act as a talisman to keep all the troubles
at bay.
But the fervency of the embrace of
evidence-based medicine reflects a deeper and much more serious problem
among the stewards of medical knowledge—a crisis of faith in the methods,
processes, and checks and balances that
have, at least since the nineteenth century, been the infrastructure that has permitted medicine to make the transition
from an art to a science. Consider the response to the recent battle over what to
do about fetal pain.
In the August 24, 2005, Journal of the
American Medical Association, an article
claimed that a review of all the available
published medical evidence showed that
fetuses do not feel pain until they are at
least seven months old. The JAMA article appeared at a time when efforts are
underway in Congress and state legislatures to use the topic of fetal pain as a
way to discourage women from seeking
elective abortions. The JAMA article
contended that there is no medical evidence showing that fetuses can feel pain
at twenty weeks. Moreover, it argued
that the provision of fetal anesthesia
would carry risks to the mother without
providing benefit of any sort either to
the fetus or the mother.
Many raised questions about the
study’s findings. But they did so in a
most peculiar way—they “outed” some
of the authors of the study as being involved with abortions or the advocacy of
abortion rights.
When JAMA published the paper, a
disclosure was included that the authors
had no financial interests in any drugs or
devices discussed. Requiring authors to
disclose financial conflicts of interest is
by now a standard requirement for all
major medical journals. But there was
no disclosure of the fact that one of the
five authors runs an abortion clinic at
San Francisco’s public hospital while another worked temporarily more than
five years ago for an abortion rights advocacy group.
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Douglas Johnson, legislative director
of the National Right to Life Committee, professed to be shocked by this
omission. “These are people with years
of professional and ideological investment in the pro-abortion cause, not
some neutral team of medical professionals,” he told the Chicago Tribune.
“We think readers and viewers have a
right to know who’s filtering the information they’re being presented with.”
It is hardly surprising that someone
active in the movement to criminalize
elective abortion would yell foul at the
idea that JAMA could have run this article without a disclosure of the proabortion involvement of some of the authors. What is astounding, and indicative of the sad state of epistemological
affairs in medicine, is that two former
editors of the New England Journal of
Medicine agreed with Johnson.
Arnold Relman told the Chicago Tribune that the editorial staff at JAMA
“must have known there would be criticism from the right-to-life people. In a
situation as contentious as this, it seems
more disclosure should be the rule
rather than less.”
Marcia Angell concurred. “Suppose
it were the other way. Suppose there
were an article that said that (fetuses) do
feel pain and it was written by people
who were involved in the right-to-life
movement. Would I want to know that?
I think I would.”
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f these claims are right, then medicine
is truly and utterly lost. If every potential source of bias is to be revealed
alongside every published article, then
medical and biomedical journals will
consist of nothing but long biographical
essays about the authors. There will be
no room for science in any journal that
seeks to identify and disclose all of its
authors’ possible biases.
There is nary an author publishing
today in biomedical journals who lacks
ambition, enemies, vices, dreams, aspirations, patriotic feelings, pride, or an
ego. These are all powerful sources of
bias. So are such factors as where one
went to school, one’s religious affilia-
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tion, political commitments, economic
status, social upbringing, cultural outlook, and character. Is all of this to be
disclosed by every author? Must we
know that an author is pursuing tenure,
wants to impress his peers, has hated a
key rival at another medical school ever
since they were together as undergraduates, is desperate to belong to the local
country club, hopes to finally make his
parents proud, lusts after a colleague’s
spouse, abjures meat, looks at pornography on the Internet, leaves bad tips, is a
Scientologist, or is gay? Is all this necessary to assess the author’s claim, based
on a review of the literature, that a fetus
does not feel pain until twenty-eight
weeks?
Medicine needs to both know what
its methods are for dealing with bias—
and for that matter for detecting
fraud—and then believe that it can
weather the storms induced by politics,
money, ambition, and greed. To put the
point another way, talking about evidence without being sure what methods, techniques, and strategies can be relied upon to produce valid evidence is
talking through your epistemological
hat.
Now as it happens, medicine does
have such methods, techniques, and
strategies. They consist of the randomized trial, the case-control study, the
drive to subject hypotheses to confirmation and falsification, the need to
demonstrate a degree of consistency
among new theories and old ones, the
family history, and the correlation of the
pathologist and the postmortem with
the diagnostician, among others.
But few physicians or those who
work with them have any sophistication
about the philosophy of science. Even
fewer have ever been taught anything
about the philosophy of medicine. And
fewer still can give a coherent presentation on what the core infrastructure is
that distinguishes the science of medicine from the faith and testimonials of
religious healers or the loopy claims of
the talk radio nutritionists.
This has got to change. The only way
for medicine to weather its current
storms is not to adopt the mantra of evidence but to know where evidence

comes from and why it is to be trusted.
If our medical schools and academic research centers do not take this need far
more seriously then they now do, if they
do not make the philosophy of medicine a part of the culture of academic
medicine and a key element that is presented when medicine travels in public,
then soon enough those who cry bias,
greed, conflict of interest, ideology, or
misconduct at any claim they do not
like will only have to make the charge to
make it stick.
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